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CRITICAL THEORY AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN:
David Trubek’s Path to New Governance
William H. Simon∗
This brief essay suggests that the discursive practices associated
with Critical Legal Studies and related movements have prescriptive
implications for institutional design. The essay, a contribution to a
festschrift for David M. Trubek, considers the trajectory of Trubek’s
work from his engagement with various critical projects to his recent
sympathetic interpretation of “new governance” in the European Union.
The tacit prescriptive implications of the critical work resonate with
some of the distinctive institutional features found in new governance.

David Trubek has played major roles in three important scholarly
movements: Law and Development, Law and Society, and Critical Legal
Studies. A major theme of his efforts has been critique. Most often,
Trubek has allied with or engaged sympathetically those who have
challenged mainstream or established discourse in the name of
egalitarian and democratic values.
The relation of critical analysis to constructive social practice is
an issue that has dogged – some might say, embarrassed -- scholarship
for a long time. Some critical scholars disclaim responsibility to
consider the practical implications of their work. Others have implied by
their adoption of conventional left positions that bear no visible influence
of their theoretical work that critique functions only defensively, warding
off unreflective conservatism to create a space for unreflective
progressivism. Trubek, however, has insisted from the beginning of his
career that critique could and should inform practice, while conceding
that the ways in which it did so were not fully understood or readily
generalized.
Now in the latest phase of his career, he has devoted himself to a
project whose main ambiguity concerns, not its practical implications,
but the extent to which it involves critique. In a series of collaborations,
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he has provided a sympathetically descriptive account of recent
developments in public policy and administration known as “new
governance”.
This move makes Trubek a promising case for
reconsideration of the question of the relation of critique and
prescription. His earlier, largely critical work was exceptionally
articulate about the practical implications of critique. And his current
work is much more prescriptive than most practitioners of critical theory
ever get. So it’s appropriate to consider how the earlier work relates to
the later.
In important respects, new governance, in the form Trubek
portrays optimistically, is distinctively responsive to the critical themes
in his earlier work. There is a normative criterion of political legitimacy
in much critical theory. It is occasionally explicit – notably in Jurgen
Habermas’s work – but more often implicit. The criterion is this:
political institutions acquire presumptive legitimacy to the extent that
they anticipate and incorporate the discursive practices exemplified by
critical scholarship. Legitimate government institutionalizes centrally
and continuously in its public decision-making processes the practices of
critical reflection and interrogation that critical theory models in
scholarship. This general principle leads some more specific ones.
When we measure new governance in the manifestations that Trubek
approves we see at least important commitments and progress in the
direction of these principles.
I first consider what Trubek’s earlier work suggests about the
practical implications of critique.
Then I consider how these
implications play out in the case of new governance. Throughout the
discussion, I refer to Critical Legal Studies practitioners, as well as the
self-identified critical practitioners within Law-and-Development and
Law-and-Society, collectively as “Crits”.
I. Critical Principles
I start with what I hope will be an uncontroversial summary of
key features of critical theoretical practice in the three legal scholarly
movements to which Trubek has contributed, and in particular, in
Trubek’s own work.
1. Anti-foundationalism. The Crits ally themselves with the
modernist denial that knowledge can be grounded in some ultimate
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reality that exists independently of our efforts to understand. The
version central to CLS emphasized a particular variation on this claim -the indeterminacy of doctrine. It conceded that there were (or might be)
abstract values that were compelling and uncontroversial but denied that
there was any neutral method which would generate from these values
answers to particular conflicts. The Crits emphasized the ways in which
conventional legal analysis tacitly smuggled conclusions into its
premises by framing issues to bracket some concerns, by selectively
invoking governing values to obscure the extent to which they were in
conflict, or by dogmatically asserting non-sequiturs.
Law-and-society people tended to treat the indeterminacy claim
as too obvious to require demonstration, and they were somewhat
surprised and perhaps annoyed that CLS work drew the attention and
controversy it did. But Trubek disagreed. Theoretically, doctrinal
criticism made an essential, though limited, contribution to explaining
the mechanisms by which law legitimated power. Strategically, it seems
to have been necessary to engage the legal establishment in the larger
critical project. Without it, mainstream legal academics found it too easy
to dismiss critique as irrelevant to professional practice.1
2. Anti-determinism. To begin with, this principle meant a
rejection of the Marxist idea that there is some material base independent
of an ideological superstructure and that the base determined the superstructure. More broadly, it disputed that there is a limited repertory of
tightly structured forms that a modern society can take. There is no
reason to believe that contemporary capitalist societies exhaust the
possible range of market-based societies or that the economic
productivity of some of these societies necessarily entails their
inegalitarian and anti-democratic features.
A lot of critical work has pursued this theme historically; so there
has been particular attention to its evolutionary variant – the claim that
poor societies must past through a well-defined path to emerge as
prosperous capitalist democracies. Trubek contributed to this critique at
both theoretical and practical levels. In his work on Weber, he
elaborated what the master himself had recognized as the “England
problem” – a key counter-example to his contention that capitalist
1
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development depended on formally rational legal rules (as opposed to the
more informal style of common-law judging).2 In his Brazilian work,
Trubek engaged the prescriptive uses of evolutionary determinism. He
showed that in the politically and economically oligarchical conditions
of Brazil, the prescriptions inferred by the determinists (liberalized
capital markets, purposive legal reasoning) turned out not to be
conducive to development (much less the democracy for which some had
also hoped).3
3. Anti-ideology. This is best term I can think of to describe
opposition to unreflective privileging of the status quo. (“Utopian”
would be another, but it has connotations of both intellectual flakiness
and programmatic daring, neither of which is deserved by the Crits.) All
of the practices to which the Crits object contribute to this privileging,
but two are especially important.
The first is the valorization of the normative commitments
proclaimed by established institutions. Doctrinal scholars do this when
they assume that the collection of authoritative reference points on
particular legal questions reflects some immanent rationality and proceed
to construct an account that makes it look harmonious and grounded in
basic values. The “gap” scholarship of interdisciplinary scholars does
something similar. It focuses on a particular piece of positive law and
proceeds to document the extent to which its presumed prescriptive
implications are unfulfilled in practice. It then proceeds in one of two
directions. Either it suggests that non-enforcement reflects some “latent
function” performed by self-equilibrating social processes. For example,
maybe the law – for example, prohibition of alcohol -- was a “symbolic
crusade” designed to ease the pain of status loss for a declining elite
rather than to affect mass behavior. More commonly, the scholar
assumes that society would benefit from more enforcement and offers
prescriptions as to how to accomplish this. The latter approach is less
conservative, but it is still ideological in assuming that there is a social
interest in closing the gap simply because the norm satisfies positivist
criteria of legality.

2
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The second practice the Crits question is the valorization of social
peace and harmony. The Law-and-Society Crits produced a large body
of analysis and research in response to policy discourse of dispute
resolution. They showed that it is a mistake to assume, as conventional
discourse does, that the emergence of disputes is exogenous to the legal
system or that their minimization is an uncontroversial social good.
Legal professionals do not just respond to claims and grievances; they
generate and influence them. Their advice can turn disappointment into
indignation, whining into claiming. To the extent that professionals
facilitate effective collective action, they may increase confidence and
solidarity in ways that reinforce and re-shape claims. Conversely,
professionals can also “cool out” clients in ways that reduce expectations
and induce resignation. It follows that “dispute resolution” is not
necessarily a good thing. Much social progress has required dispute
generation. And much of what passes for dispute resolution involves the
dampening of potentially progressive political impulses. Of course, the
distinction between progressive and regressive change depends on
political criteria. The Crits’ point is that political criteria are inevitable,
and they are best made explicit.
Trubek engaged both gap sociology and the dispute resolution
literature in his synthetic essays.4 With respect to dispute resolution, he
also contributed directly to the Law-and-Society critique of the
“litigation explosion” ideology that portrayed litigation as a
metastasizing social cancer. The research showed that litigation was less
prevalent and less expensive than conventional rhetoric claimed.5
4. Anti-separation-of-powers. Conventional discourse presumes
a strong separation between enactment of law and its enforcement.
Enactment settles issues of value; enforcement implements the
settlement. Enactment occurs through relatively democratic processes;
enforcement occurs through relatively technocratic ones. Thus, particular
enforcement decisions have democratic legitimacy to the extent that they
implement democratic commands. The Weberian view of bureaucracy
as a mechanism for automatic implementation of hierarchicallypromulgated norms through formal rules fits helpfully into the picture.
4
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In the legal academy, the picture is complicated by the acknowledgement
that enacted law is characteristically ambiguous and therefor requires the
interpretive efforts of lawyers and judges. In both the popular and the
professional views, the action is at the top – legislators, judges, and elite
lawyers make the critical decisions that are then passively implemented
by the foot soldiers of the state.
All the Crits insist that the output of top level legislative and
interpretive activity remains too ambiguous to determine street-level
decisions (and even if it were determinate, top-level officials lack the
practical capacity to enforce compliance by subordinates).
The
interdisciplinary Crits follow the point up by shifting attention to the
street level.
In myriad studies, they showed that street-level
administration is not a process of passive implementation of centrallydetermined commands. It is an unmistakably political process in which
unresolved value questions are settled informally in ways usually
influenced by social inequality.
The interdisciplinary Crits revised the Weberian picture of
bureaucracy, but they did not reject it entirely. The difficulties of
supervision and the rigidities of rules made bureaucracy a cumbersome
tool for most social problems, but a bureaucratic program that would
regulate narrowly and tolerate a lot of over-inclusion relative to social
need might work. An example was non-means tested public assistance
that provided benefits to, say, all families with children regardless of
income. But to the extent that more precise targeting was needed,
bureaucracy would not work. In the tradition of social theory, the
prominent alternative was Durkheim’s idea of public service
professionalism -- discretion canalized by socialization and peer review.
Unfortunately, another body of research showed that such street level
public servants often exercised discretion in irresponsible and oppressive
ways.
Trubek was not directly involved in the Crit work on street-level
administration, but he was strongly associated with it. His Wisconsin
colleague Joel Handler was a key figure. And so was Louise Trubek,
both as scholar and practitioner.
II. Practical Implications of Critique
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The way to infer the practical implications of this critical practice
is to ask what kinds of institutions would be immune to it. Not immune
in the sense that the institutions had solved all the problems that critique
might reveal. But immune in the sense that the institutions had fully
internalized the critical practices. Or coopted them in the sense, not of
neutralizing them, but of incorporating them full bore into its standard
operating procedures. Taking this approach, we can infer four conditions
of presumptive political legitimacy. I have named the four conditions
after friends, collaborators, and people whom Trubek has acknowledged
as influences. The four conditions do not constitute a complete political
vision. They presuppose some variation of the conventional elements of
liberal democracy, such as fair electoral process and civil and welfare
rights. But they add an additional set of criteria sometimes overlooked
that critical theory emphasizes and deepens.
1. The Habermas condition. Public norms should ideally be
based on consensus among affected citizens derived through a process of
open, respectful, and non-coercive discourse. Crits in the U.S. legal
academy have been ambivalent about Habermas and the discourse
principle, but Trubek suggested in 1984 that they might need it.6 The
consensus ideal responds to the practical dilemma that follows the
rejection of foundationalism. Consensus is modernity’s substitute for
traditional and rationalist normative foundations.7 While the Crit
reservations are important (see the next condition), they don’t leave the
idea without utility.
Consensus is not a pre-requisite for collective action. It is
impractical for most decisions, and it would be unjust to give those who
benefit from the status quo a veto over proposed changes. The
consensus condition just means that we should seek consensus to the
extent that is practical and we should have more confidence in our
judgments to the extent that we achieve it. The condition is a useful
heuristic even though it is unlikely ever to be fully satisfied for any
complex problem. As long as we can measure the proximity of actual
circumstances to the consensus ideal, it can serve as a useful measure of
legitimacy. Note this approach differs from claims of legitimacy based
on the imagined possibility of consent in some hypothetical situation like
6
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the Original Position. Here we measure legitimacy by the distance
between idealized consent and the quality of consent in the actual
decision-making process.
2. The Kennedy condition: This condition is the negative
implication of the Anti-Foundationalist position. It requires that public
policy and practice be formulated and implemented with maximum
feasible self-consciousness and transparency. Official decision-makers
should forbear from efforts to give their conclusions a veneer of
necessity or entailment. There are many Crits whose names we could
plausibly attach to this condition, but I name it after Duncan Kennedy
because he has been a major influence on Trubek and because he is
probably the legal scholar most identified with the position that critique
tends to have progressive political effects.8
Kennedy’s critical practice has been focused on elite judicial and
academic discourse. Some Law-and-Society scholars carried on this
project at the level of street-level discourse of low-status lawyers and
low-level public officials. With their work in mind, we could have
called this principle the “Amherst condition” after the group of scholars
centered in Amherst, Massachusetts, whose work Trubek analyzed
admiringly (and whose anxious relation with Kennedy Trubek sought to
mediate).9
But from either the top or the bottom, the condition is the same.
For official decision-makers and their apologists, it requires selfconsciousness and candor about the inconclusive and conflicted nature of
the authority they invoke, recognition of relevant competing values, and
acknowledgement of the political quality of the decision-making process.
For advocates and advisors, it means willingness to acknowledge their
own relevant interests and anxieties, to empathetically explore their
clients concerns, and to frame advice in a way that maximizes clients’
understanding of the range of possibilities and the nature of the
constraints that they face.
3. The Unger condition: Entrenched social practices and
structures should be subject to institutionalized pressures that encourage
challenge and induce re-examination. This condition resonates with the
rejection of ideology. It is named after Roberto Unger, another Trubek
8
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friend whose work exalts the individual and social capacity for selftranscendence.10
The Unger condition requires the protection and, indeed,
encouragement of diversity in public and private life. In the public
sphere, it requires opportunities to challenge concentrated private power
through antitrust-type protections and irresponsible public agencies
through means such as “public law litigation”. In social life, it prescribes
a kind of education that develops a capacity to thrive in circumstances of
diversity and to distance one’s self reflectively from convention.
The Unger condition is designed as an antidote to the tendency of
consensus and cooperation to congeal into unreflective and dysfunctional
conformity. It is, of course, potentially in tension with the Habermas
condition, and managing that tension is a critical goal of institutional
design.
4. The Sabel condition: Institutions and programs should be
designed so that their purposes can be re-considered and elaborated in
the course of implementation. Institutions should facilitate learning,
self-assessment, and re-orientation. They must combine transparency
and provisionality. Institutional goals should be articulated along with
performance measures, and both goals and measures should be
reconsidered continuously in the light of experience. Practice norms
should be fully explicit, but they should not require agents to take actions
that contravene the purposes of the program. When rules conflict with
purposes, the response should be neither counter-purposive compliance
nor low-visibility adjustment. The agent should disregard the rule and
take the action that furthers the programs purpose, while triggering a
process of review that, if her judgment is sustained, leads to the prompt
elaboration of the rule to take account of the new contingency. Peer
review and the duty-to-explain take the place of Weberian rules in
controlling discretion. The Sabel condition erodes the distinction
between free-standing organizations and federations or associations of
organizations. The techniques of rolling rules and peer review can be
applied across organizations as well as within them.
The continuously self-revising organization (a/k/a lean
production, learning organization, self-managing organization, evidence10

E.g., Roberto Mangabeira Unger, False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social
Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy 277-312 (1987).

9

based practice) has been shown especially effective in the private
economy with products and markets that require strong customization
and/or frequent adaptation to new circumstances. Many public problems
now seem to call for the same contextualizing and adaptive capacities in
government organizations. From the point of view of liberal democracy,
some variations of these organizations are appealing because the
qualities that make them efficient in dealing with some problems also
make them conducive to democratic accountability. Such organizations
encourage lower-tier administrative creativity and stakeholder
participation, and they make practice broadly transparent in ways that
facilitate accountability to upper-tier administrators, coordinate political
institutions, and the public sphere.
The Sabel condition is a negative implication of the rejection of
the separation of powers, and more generally, of the distinction between
enactment and enforcement. It is named after Charles Sabel, who has
insisted on the pertinence of “continuous improvement” models of
private organization to the public sphere, and has specifically used such
models to develop an account of the European Union.11
III. New Governance
The “new governance” idea arises from convergent efforts to
understand the expanding roles of international organizations, the
evolution of the European Union, and the trend toward decentralizing
reforms in policy implementation in a variety of countries, especially the
U.S. and the U.K. These developments have many variations, and there
are many interpretations of their general significance. The work on the
EU to which Trubek has contributed has been cautiously optimistic, and
it thus converges with work on international organization and domestic
policy reform that views at least some manifestations of the new
developments as promising. I will not try to assess the plausibility of
this cautious optimism about the EU, a task complicated by the current
economic crisis. I will limit myself to pointing out those features in
11
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Trubek’s account of the EU that seem responsive to the institutional
implications of critique. (I attribute these ideas only to Trubek, even
though he developed them in a series of collaborations, and I don’t try to
take account of how the ideas overlap and resonate with the large new
governance literature. Trubek might have preferred a less Trubek-centric
account, but that is not what the occasion calls for.)
1. The Habermas condition.
Legally, the EU is an
intergovernmental organization.
Traditionally, intergovernmental
organizations operate by consensus among member nations, as
represented by their diplomats. As the EU has evolved away from this
traditional form, the consensus norm has been diluted, but it continues to
exert influence. Nonconsensus decisions still require a kind of supermajority (“qualified majority”), and they can be made only across a
limited range of competences. At the same time, engagement across
member states has thickened, including not just senior executives, but a
European parliament (though it does not figure in Trubek’s picture) and
a series of committees and agencies in which mid-level officials, experts,
and NGO delegates participate. This combination of a diluted consensus
norm and a thickened range of cross-national engagement would seem to
push the EU along a deliberative path.
Trubek has been especially interested in the phenomenon of “soft
law”. The EES and the OMC create basically procedural duties, and
even these are not enforceable in any tangibly coercive way. Yet, they
seem to have motivated substantive change. Trubek has analyzed how
soft law duties might motivate action. They include “shaming” (fear of
peer disdain), “mimesis” (a desire to justify your conduct as
conventional) and “discursive transformation,” which Trubek, following
Kirsten Jacobson, describes as “the construction of ‘a new perspective
from which reality can be descried, phenomena classified, positions
taken, and actions justified’.”12 Shaming and mimesis sound more like
Durkheim than Habermas, and discursive transformation sounds
uncomfortably like Foucault. But Trubek also suggests a more
Habermasian interpretation in which new governance succeeds by “by
bring[ing] people with diverse perspectives together in settings that

12
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require sustained deliberation about problem-solving” that leads them to
“collectively redefine objectives and policies.”13
2. The Kennedy condition. Trubek sees the post-Maastricht EU
developments, especially the European Employment Strategy and the
Open Method of Coordination, as cracking open conventional legal and
political understandings. “[T]raditional principles of legitimacy drawn
from state-based models do not work at the European level and may be
obsolete at the national level as well.”14 Notably, there is no visible
unitary sovereign to which authority can be attributed. Opponents of the
EU attack it for failing to conform to conventional assumptions, and
defenders strain to reconfigure or portray it as only a modest departure.
But Trubek suggests that practical policy discourse in this terrain has
been (or is likely to become) significantly unencumbered by ideological
baggage and more open and reflective.
If true, this could be a transitional phenomenon of the sort we
expect in moments of dramatic reconstruction but that typically wanes as
new institutional forms are consolidated. But some of the “mechanisms
that destabilize existing understandings” in the new arrangements might
operate long term. In particular, there is the commitment to diversity
(the Unger condition) and to experimentation (the Sabel condition).
The new governance forms to which Trubek drew attention
require policy makers both to tolerate and to take account of diverse
perspectives and practices. Decision-makers come from different
national cultures. Trubek points out that the problems with which EU
social policy has been pre-occupied straddle the boundaries of academic
discipline and agency jurisdictions. This straddling contributes another
dimension of diversity. The thinner the base of shared assumptions, the
greater the pressure to explain, and thus to reflect, on premises that might
otherwise be taken for granted. Moreover, the need to take account of
the range of viable institutional forms in member states subverts the
tendency to under-estimate the range of viable institutional forms. At the
same time, the experimentalist dimension of these reforms requires that
deliberators submit their premises to the test of experience. This might
subvert tendencies to fundamentalist dogmatism.
13

Trubek and Mosher, cited in note , at 357.
Joanne Scott and David M. Trubek, Mind the Gap: Law and New Approaches
to Governance in the European Union, 8 European Law Journal 1 (2002).

14

12

3. The Unger condition. This condition stipulates that consensus
must not come at the expense of the kinds of diversity that stimulate
awareness of a broad range of possibility in culture, politics, and the
economy. Trubek sees the commitment to diversity as a major strength
of the EU. EU consensus is a thin or overlapping consensus that
contemplates and indeed protects diversity among and within member
states.
Expansion has brought increasing diversity among member
states, and association appears to have some influence on protection of
diversity within member states. The admission process appears to have
had a significant liberalizing effect on expansion states. And some of
these pressures appear to continue among member states. Gender
equality and social inclusion are among the declared goals of the
European Employment Strategy, and there are metrics associated with
them.
A pertinent theme in judicial review of administrative action is
reduced attention to questions of competence and authority in favor of
concern with representation and inclusiveness. For example, Trubek
sees the EUAPME case as potentially adumbrating a quasi-constitutional
principle that would condition recognition of the normative output of
stakeholder regimes on adequate representation of affected interests.15
4. The Sabel condition. Trubek has explicitly interpreted the EES
and the OMC as examples of Sabel’s idea of experimentalist or directlydeliberative governance.16 The basic elements are: general agreement on
goals and measures of progress toward them, followed by member state
plans, self-monitoring, and reporting to the EU; followed by peer review,
followed by reconsideration and re-elaboration of goals and metrics. All
part of a continuous cycle. More recently, Trubek has interpreted
developments in international law, particularly around the WTO treaties,
in terms of collaborative problem-solving.17
As Trubek notes, this approach precludes any strong distinction
between rule enactment and rule enforcement. Efforts to implement the
15
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norms lead to greater understanding of them both through local
experience and through the pooling of experiences in the peer review
process. Political accountability is re-configured. Traditional legal
theory emphasizes a backward-looking process in which courts confine
administrators to the mandates of generalist legislatures. In the new
processes, accountability is more specialized and more prospective. On
the one hand, it occurs through the deliberative horizontal engagement of
parties with special interests and expertise. On the other, it defers to
legislatures by making its activities transparent to oversight by
traditional democratic institutions.

IV. Conclusion
Readers are struck by both the range of Trubek’s scholarship and
its continued engagement with new events and ideas. Trubek has never
sought the benefits of narrow expertise or yielded to the temptation to
rest on early triumphs. Yet, there is also a notable continuity in his
work. Few people have been more ambitious in their efforts to bring
critique and prescription together. It remains to be seen whether new
governance will prove a durable set of innovations. It does, however,
seem deeply responsive to the prescriptive implications of Crit
scholarship. No doubt this is not the only programmatic response that
could be derived from the critiques. But thanks in important measure to
Trubek, it is the most elaborated one.
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